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Introduction 
In the current era of liberal democracies, state policies need to respect fundamental rights at all 
times, in particular when making, developing and implementing legislation and policies. In other 
words: fundamental rights constitute the outer framework within which states need to ‘work’ and 
develop their policies, legislation and related practices. This is also the case for the ever-increasing 
‘super-diversity’ they are confronted with. This article is not concerned with empirical processes and 
policy implications thereof. It rather studies the extent to which ‘super-diversity’ is reflected upon in 
the interpretation of legal norms, more particularly, fundamental rights norms. The ensuing call to 
take super-diversity –more consistently- into account within the human rights paradigm, stimulates 
and develops that paradigm, which in turn determines the framework for policy development. In 
other words, the analysis in this working paper contributes at least indirectly to the emerging field of 
super-diversity.  
It is first of all important to specify in what way the concept ‘super-diversity’ is used in this working 
paper, which allows to establish a link between super-diversity on the one hand and minorities and 
their fundamental rights on the other. Subsequently, the focus on the jurisprudence of one particular 
international court is justified, as well as the selection of the case-law which will be analysed,  
Since the concept of super-diversity was coined by Steve Vertovec in his 2007 article ‘Super-diversity 
and its implications’, it has been the subject of several publications, and major conferences mainly in 
the field of social sciences (Meissner 2012).  While Vertovec intended to capture with ‘super-
diversity’ the multiple axes of differentiation that have to be taken into account when researching 
migration-related diversity, going beyond ethnicity (Vertovec 2007), several authors use the term to 
refer to an increased diversity of ethnic backgrounds, without adding other dimensions (Meissner 
2012). In this article a related, yet different use of ‘super-diversity’ is adopted, namely one that is not 
so much concerned with migration as such but rather with the interaction of different kinds of ethnic 
(including religious) groups. ‘Super-diversity’ in this article thus remains within the confines of 
‘ethnicity’ (in the broad sense) while focusing on the relation between the different layers of ethnic 
diversity, and more particularly on the relation between the actual rights and rights claims of 
(persons belonging to) the respective groups. These different layers of ethnic diversity mostly 
concern traditional (indigenous) diversity versus ‘new’ layers of ethnic diversity. Still, as is visible in 
relation to religious diversity, ‘new’ layers do not necessarily need to have a migrant origin. The 
different layers can also refer to ethnic groups with different degrees of anciennité in the country 
concerned. In addition, regard is had to the relation of rights and rights claims of ethnic groups on 
the one hand and rights of (purely) religious groups on the other.  
Super-diversity may not (yet) be a term of art in the field of fundamental rights, (international) courts 
are undoubtedly confronted with human rights cases that de facto concern ‘super-diversity’ (as used 
here). Hence, it is surely relevant to analyse the case law of these courts so as to distill their 
approach towards ‘super-diversity’, more particularly to identify to what extent super-diversity 
related factors are taken into account within the human rights analysis.  
Since super-diversity -as used here- refers to ethnic population diversity and the analysis focuses on 
the rights (claims) of the distinctive groups, regard must and will be given to the burgeoning 
literature on minorities and their fundamental rights, particularly the general, not-minority-specific 
rights (Gilbert 2002, Henrard 2008, Ringelheim 2006). 
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This article focuses on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) since it is 
undoubtedly the most renowned international court specialized in adjudicating human rights cases 
(Grear 2007). It may be a regional court, related to the Council of Europe’s European Convention on 
Human rights (ECHR), its jurisprudence is a source of inspiration in other regional systems and also in 
several highest national courts in countries outside Europe (including Canada, the US and South 
Africa: inter alia Henrard 2002; Mak 2013). The EU’s intended ratification of the ECHR further 
buttresses the standing of the European Court of Human Rights as the latter will then be the highest 
court in the EU legal order for human rights related matters (Eeckhout 2013). 
In view of feasibility concerns, the analysis in this article will be confined to a selection of cases of the 
ECtHR. All are prominent cases that concern different layers of ’ethnic’ diversity and differences 
between the fundamental rights of the respective groups, while reflecting cross-cutting differences 
and similarities. Two cases concern political participation rights of different categories/kinds of 
ethnic population diversity. Four cases evaluate differential rights for relatively new religious and 
philosophical traditions as compared to more traditional religions: two on registration of religions 
and two on religion in education. The final case addresses a differential regime regarding the official 
recognition of minority marriages for religious minorities as compared to ethnic minorities. 
The working paper starts with a theoretical frame of analysis regarding human rights, interpretation 
principles and requirements for limitations to rights. Subsequently the selected cases of the ECtHR 
are analysed. The comparison of the reasoning in these cases and their outcomes arguably expose 
that the Court has not yet developed a particular strategy (and related criteria) in relation to cases on 
super-diversity, and thus concerning differentiation in terms of rights for (the members of) different 
types of ethnic population groups. The paper proceeds with an argument why it is imperative for the 
ECtHR (and international courts more generally) to develop such a strategy and incorporate super-
diversity considerations consistently in the reasoning of judgments on fundamental rights of the 
respective groups concerned. The article concludes with some recommendations for the Court, on 
how it should proceed when developing its jurisprudence to incorporate super-diversity 
considerations. 
Theoretical frame of analysis: human rights, interpretation, limitation analysis 
When one wants to establish the current state of the art regarding human rights, research cannot be 
limited to the text of the relevant conventions only. The interpretation of the respective norms by 
the courts i throughout their review of state compliance is equally important (Christoffersen 2009; 
Smith 2013). Another important general consideration is that most fundamental rights are not 
absolute. Consequently, under certain conditions states can legitimately limit the enjoyment of these 
rights. In human rights law considerable attention goes to the interpretation principles adopted by 
the courts to assess whether particular limitations on the effective enjoyment of rights amount to 
legitimate limitations or to violations of the right concerned. The analysis tends to proceed in (at 
least) two stages (Van der Schyff 2005).  First it needs to be considered whether the facts of the case 
come within the scope of application of one or more fundamental rights. For example does the 
wearing of a religious garment concern the manifestation of a religion, and thus comes within the 
scope of application of the freedom of religion? Once that is established, and an interference is made 
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out with the enjoyment of the right, the analysis turns to the justification for that interference put 
forward by the (respondent) state. 
Important interpretation principles have been developed for human rights, that go beyond the 
‘normal meaning of the words’ (Arato 2012) and reflect the specific characteristics of human rights 
treaties. A teleological interpretation implies that the interpretation of a provision is guided by its 
aim, objective, and/or underlying rationale, at times by the underlying principles of the human rights 
treaty as a whole, such as human dignity and pluralism (de Schutter & Tulkens 2008).  Following the 
evolutive interpretation principle the Court underscores the importance to interpret the rights 
enshrined in the Convention in a way which is in line with the changed conditions and circumstances 
in society, so that these rights remain practical and effective (Dzehtsariou and O’Mahony 2012-
2013). This interpretation principle leads to developments in the jurisprudence, most of the time in 
favour of a more extensive interpretation of the scope of application, and a more demanding review 
of limitations of rights.  
The reference to the need for rights to be practical and effective is actually an overriding concern of 
the European Court of Human Rights, closely related to the principle of effective protection of 
fundamental rights (Dzehtsiarou and C. O’ Mahony 2013). This is also visible in the second stage or 
the limitations analysis and more particularly in relation to the central requirement that limitations 
need to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the state (Waldock 1980).  In a system 
where the effective protection of fundamental rights is the goal, the scope of legitimate limitations is 
restricted. This translates in principle in a rather demanding review or level of scrutiny by the court of 
the justification put forward by the state. The level of scrutiny is inversely related to the discretion 
the court leaves to states. In other words, a more demanding scrutiny implies little discretion for the 
states, while an extensive discretion for the state implies a lenient, easy-going scrutiny. Arguably, the 
more demanding the review by the court, the stronger the protection of the right concerned 
(Christoffersen 2009).  Inversely, when a broad discretion is left to states, the scrutiny is so lenient, 
that one could argue that the Court more or less leaves the matter to the state concerned, thus 
sharply reducing the protection of the right concerned. 
However, from early on the ECtHR has developed a margin of appreciation doctrine in relation to the 
proportionality principle as an emanation of the fact that its protection is merely subsidiary to the 
primary responsibility of the contracting states to protect the rights enshrined in the convention 
(Arai-Takahashi 2002, Christoffersen 2009). Following the preceding argumentation, ‘in principle’ this 
margin of appreciation  left to states would be narrow. Unfortunately, this is not the line that the 
Court has adopted. The margin the Court is willing to grant to the contracting states may not always 
be equally extensive, in several matters it is rather broad indeed, as the subsequent case analysis will 
confirm. In so far as granting a broad margin of appreciation implies that the Court is actually not 
evaluating the proportionality (and thus the legitimacy) of the interference concerned, one could 
argue the Court is abdicating its supervisory role (Legg 2012).  Consequently, no guidance is given to 
the contracting states about the relevant criteria for the proportionality test, and jurisprudential 
refinements do not occur. 
Throughout its case law, the Court has identified several factors that influence the width of the 
margin of appreciation in a particular case. Factors that feature prominently in this respect include 
the nature of the fundamental right concerned and the degree to which there would be a European 
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consensus on the matter (Arai-Takahashi 2002, Shelton 2006). When a right is considered to be 
essential to a democratic society, such as the freedom of expression, or the right concerns ‘a 
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity’ (Evans v UK, par.30) and is thus 
crucial for the individual’s well-being, the margin of appreciation will be restricted (Schokkenbroek 
1998).  
According to the Court’s steady jurisprudence, and particularly important for the following case 
analysis, the absence of European consensus should entail a broad margin of appreciation and thus a 
very lenient scrutiny. This position is not self-evident. One could also argue that exactly in situations 
where there is not yet a particular European consensus, that would be the moment for the 
international supervisor to set the boundaries. Importantly, an argument against leaving states a 
(broad) margin of appreciation does not advocate for a uniform standard, but rather for guidance 
about minimum protection levels (Henrard 2012).  At the same time, the limits of international law 
need to be acknowledged, and especially the lack of enforcement possibilities of legally binding 
judgments against recalcitrant states. Put differently, the Court’s judgments may be legally binding, 
in the end, the Court is dependent on the willingness of the states to actually abide by these 
judgments. This in turn implies that the Court needs to respect – at least to some extent- national 
traditions and sensitivities of the contracting states.  
 A lack of consensus is particularly visible regarding highly controversial themes: ethical issues, moral 
choices and choices about the place of religion in society, minorities and their rights. These themes 
tend to be so closely bound up with perceptions of national constitutional identity that the ECtHR is 
careful not to impose particular views, and steer towards European consensus. Put differently, in 
cases on controversial themes, the Court tends to be concerned about maintaining its political 
legitimacy.  This concern entails a careful approach, leaving considerable room for national choices 
and related national differentiation, so as to avoid delivering judgments that are utterly unacceptable 
for the member states.  
It goes beyond the confines of this paper to develop a sustained critique of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine of the Court (see in this respect Henrard 2012). However, in addition to the 
principled concern expressed above, the Court’s margin of appreciation doctrine has also been said 
to actually undermine the legitimacy the Court is trying so anxiously to maintain (inter alia Dembour 
2006). The argumentation developed (infra) in this paper, towards the inclusion of super-diversity 
considerations in the Court’s reasoning (in relevant cases) ties to rule of law arguments, that also 
feature prominently in critiques of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
Case law analysis 
Since super-diversity tends to be bound up with controversial questions that are closely related to 
the national constitutional identity of contracting states, one would expect the Court to almost 
categorically grant states a wide margin of appreciation in cases pertaining to super-diversity.  
However, the following case analysis demonstrates that no such ‘principled’ approach is 
forthcoming. At times the Court acknowledges the differential treatment between distinctive layers 
of ethnic diversity and will be ready to pressure states in a particular direction. Often, though, the 
Court seems to prefer to ignore the underlying differential treatment and to leave states a wide 
margin, not steering towards European convergence. Moreover, the Court does not acknowledge 
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these different approaches, let alone explain them in terms of relevant variables (and differences in 
this respect). Consequently, it is not (yet) possible to identify clear overarching principles in the 
Court’s jurisprudence for cases concerning ‘super-diversity’. 
Super-diversity (more traditional v new ethnic groups) and political participation  
Two cases regarding political participation in relation to different categories of minorities are 
particularly noteworthy, both in themselves and in relation to one another. In both cases access to 
electoral rights was restricted for some ethnic groups. However in one case the Court scrutinized 
mildly, concluding to a non-violation, while in the other the Court acknowledges both factors that 
point towards strict scrutiny and factors that would call for lenient scrutiny, fully reasoning its 
ultimate conclusion of a violation of the Convention. 
In Gorzelik v Poland (17 February 2004) the European Court of Human Rights had to evaluate the 
refusal to register an association that explicitly invoked the qualification ‘national minority’.  This 
refusal is related to the Polish legal system’s distinction between national minorities on the one hand 
and ethnic minorities on the other (par. 69). While the former are allowed to associate as such to 
pursue their common goals, they are not granted particular privileges, notably regarding passive 
electoral rights. These privileges are reserved for ‘national minorities’ (par. 105). Strikingly, the 
national legal system does not provide definitions of these two categories of minorities, let alone 
stipulates particular criteria that need to be fulfilled, and procedures that can be followed to obtain 
one or the other status. In practice national minorities are exclusively identified through bilateral 
treaties between Poland and another state (par. 61-63, 69-71).  
A group of persons claiming to represent the Silesian minority attempted to register an association, 
under the name of Association of the Silesian National Minority. The registration was refused 
because the Silesian minority is not a national minority under Polish law and one suspected a ruse by 
the group concerned to claim electoral privileges the group would not be entitled to (par. 82-84). 
The Court does repeat its steady line of jurisprudence on article 11’s freedom of association that the 
freedom of association can only be legitimately limited in very narrow circumstances. In other words, 
states have a narrow margin of appreciation in the matter (par. 88, see also par. 95). The Court also 
underscores that in democratic societies the views of the majority should not always prevail but that 
a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities (par. 90). The 
Court furthermore recognizes that the freedom of association is particularly important for persons 
belonging to minorities, national and ethnic minorities alike (par. 93). Notwithstanding these 
promising lines of argumentation, all of which seem to point to a rather serious scrutiny, the Court 
chooses not to scrutinize strictly this refusal to register the association concerned. The Court does 
not explicitly argue the width of the margin of appreciation it grants Poland, but it appears to leave a 
particularly broad margin, seemingly because of the combination of three factors, each of which are 
characterized by a lack of European consensus. 
Firstly, the Court had earlier in the same judgment highlighted that there is no consensus among 
contracting states, neither regarding the definition of minority, nor the practice of officially 
recognizing them (par. 67-68). Secondly, since the refusal to register is related to particular electoral 
privileges, the Court relies on its steady line of jurisprudence that the contracting states have a wide 
margin of appreciation in the design of their electoral system. ii Finally, the Court hints at its steady 
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line of jurisprudence that states have a broad margin of appreciation when balancing conflicting 
individual interests and rights. The Court refers indeed to the potential clash between the ‘rights of 
other persons or entities participating in parliamentary elections’ against infringement in case the 
association would indeed seek to prevail itself of the electoral privileges of a national minority (par. 
103).  
In view of the numerous hints at the appropriateness of a broad margin of appreciation for states, it 
was not that surprising that the Court concluded to the non-violation of art. 11. Nevertheless, it 
remains striking that the underlying and glaring differential treatment between ethnic minorities on 
the one hand and national minorities on the other is entirely glossed over, and that no 
argumentation is put forward about the (reasonable and objective) justification for this differential 
treatment. The Court does not even acknowledge that the differential treatment concerned is at 
least indirectly based on ethnic grounds. Consequently, there is also no reference to the starting 
position of strict scrutiny for differentiations on the basis of ethnicity. Actually, in Gorzelik the Court 
simply accepts the choice made in Poland to grant particular ethnic minorities an electoral 
advantage, and not to others, and does not even scrutinize whether this differentiation is in line with 
the prohibition of discrimination.  
In Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina (22 December 2009) the ECtHR is confronted with a 
differentiation between ethnic groups that is arguably even more intertwined with the national 
constitutional identity of the country concerned. In line with the power sharing agreement that was 
concluded in Bosnia-Herzegovina following a bloody civil war, only persons belonging to the three 
Constituent Peoples (the Bosniacs, the Croats and the Serbs) are allowed to 1) stand for election to 
one of the two houses of parliament, and 2) are eligible to become president of the country. The 
power sharing agreement is widely considered to be an essential pillar of the fragile balance the 
country has currently found (see also the dissent by Judge Bonello).  
Two Bosnian nationals that belonged to ‘other groups’, more particularly the Roma and Jews 
respectively, challenged this arrangement as violating the prohibition of discrimination. Arguably, the 
difference between the constituent peoples and ‘the others’ refers to a distinction between groups 
that are considered more ‘indigenous’, more ‘traditional’ than others. The case concerns in any event 
a glaring differentiation on ethnic grounds.  
The Court acknowledges this and starts its analysis by pointing out that such differentiations on 
ethnic grounds tend to trigger heightened (strict) scrutiny: ‘where a difference in treatment is based 
on race or ethnicity, the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be interpreted as 
strictly as possible’ (par. 44). However, the Court immediately goes on to highlight that ‘Article 14 
does not prohibit Contracting Parties from treating groups differently in order to correct ‘factual 
inequalities’ between them’ (ibid.) This expression can be understood as indicating that measures of 
‘positive action’ are not presumed to be illegitimate, which would imply that it is actually not 
necessary to adopt heightened scrutiny (Henrard 2011b). 
In other words, the Court seems to show a willingness to accept in principle differentiations on the 
basis of ethnicity in this type of power sharing setting,  
aimed at restoring the peace, ending a period of conflict and ethnic cleansing (par. 45), and in the 
end at ensuring ‘effective equality between the constituent peoples’. The actual level of scrutiny 
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adopted by the Court indeed does not appear to be particularly demanding as the Court even 
exhibits sympathy for the adoption of power sharing arrangements in this particular context.  
Nevertheless, the Court is ultimately swayed by the particularly radical nature of the total exclusion 
of representatives of the other groups, and concludes to a violation of the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In this respect reference is made to a study of the Venice 
commission, which clearly demonstrated that power-sharing arrangements do not necessarily have 
to go hand in hand with the total exclusion of representatives of the other communities (par. 48, 
referring to par. 22). Arguably, the radical nature of the arrangement is such that it would have been 
difficult not to conclude to a disproportionate differentiation, and thus a prohibited discrimination, 
even under regular scrutiny (Henrard 2011b). 
In Sejdic-Finci 
iii
 the Court explicitly acknowledges the unusual context, and the related intricate 
political considerations pertaining to peace and stability, demonstrating a keen understanding of the 
related sensitivities (Tran 2011; Wakely 2010).  Notwithstanding the various hints at the 
appropriateness of a level of scrutiny which is below ‘strict scrutiny’, the Court still actually 
scrutinizes the differential treatment between ‘constituent peoples’ and other ethnic population 
groups. The total nature of the exclusion of particular groups is considered disproportionate, and 
entails a violation of the prohibition of discrimination.  In the process, the Court chose to take a clear 
stance against a particular national regulation notwithstanding it being closely bound up with 
national constitutional identity.  
When comparing the two cases, the Court’s reasoning in Sejdic-Finci is in several respects different 
from that in Gorzelik. The argumentation in Sejdic-Finci is both more explicit and more nuanced. 
What is particularly important for the analysis here is that the Court in Sejdic-Finci clearly did not 
completely refrain from scrutinizing the differential treatment concerned, as it did in Gorzelik. In 
other words, in the former case the Court does engage with the super-diverse context, in a context-
sensitive manner, while it chooses to ignore the super-diversity dimension in the latter case.  The two 
cases are set in a very different context, indeed, but differences of degree and of sensitivity can be 
taken on board in the proportionality analysis, as is nicely visible in Sejdic-Finci. However, in Gorzelik 
the Court does not even get into the proportionality analysis, its reasoning stops with the grant of a 
broad margin of appreciation to Poland. This extreme hands-off approach would seem to indicate 
that the Gorzelik matter is actually more sensitive than the Sejdic-Finci one? The marked differences 
in the Court’s reasoning and approach in both cases arguably reveal that the Court has simply not yet 
developed a particular strategy for cases on super-diversity. 
Super-diversity in the religious field (traditional and dominant religious groups versus newer 
religious minorities) 
The lack of a principled approach by the ECtHR to ‘super-diversity’ is similarly visible in its case law on 
the freedom of religion, more particularly in cases involving the (differential) treatment of traditional 
and dominant religious groups, compared to new(er) religious minorities. The following analysis will 
reveal that not only does the Court use different ‘benchmarks’ for different ‘religious freedom’ 
themes, but also within one particular theme a consistent approach is lacking. Two ‘religious 
freedom’ themes that reveal a different base-line approach by the Court are the registration 
(recognition) of religions on the one hand and religion in education on the other hand. While the 
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former is ‘governed’ by article 9, the lex generalis of the freedom of religion; article 2 of the first 
additional protocol is considered to be the lex specialis thereof in educational matters. 
According to the Court, the freedom of religion’s central value is religious pluralism and this 
translates into a steady line of jurisprudence underscoring state duties of neutrality and impartiality 
(Nieuwenhuis 2007). States are indeed supposed to be neutral and impartial organizers of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, while its overall role is meant to be conducive to 
religious harmony and tolerance (Tulkens 2009). The freedom of religion is also often highlighted to 
be a cornerstone or one of the foundations of a democratic society, arguably pointing towards a 
narrow margin of appreciation (Henrard 2012).  
However, in a broad variety of religious freedom cases the Court chooses to focus on the absence of 
a European consensus regarding ‘religion-state relations’ to grant states a wide margin of 
appreciation (Henrard 2012). The wide margin of appreciation for states tends to imply an extensive 
deference by the Court to the diverse national constitutional traditions in this regard. This deference 
to diverse national constitutional traditions is  maintained also when these traditions reflect 
majoritarian assertions of national cultures permeated by Christian values – implying negative 
attitudes towards minority religions (Augenstein 2011; Martinez Torron 2012; Ungureanu 2011). This 
deference even goes as far as maintaining that a state church is not – as such- incompatible with the 
Convention, notwithstanding the obvious tensions between a state church on the one hand and state 
duties of neutrality and impartiality on the other (Henrard 2011a). 
Nevertheless, regarding registration and cooperation systems used by states in relation to religions 
and religious communities the Court is de facto increasingly becoming demanding. It may still hold on 
to the wide margin of appreciation concerning religion-state relations, the Court now scrutinizes 
rather closely whether the criteria used in these systems are non-discriminatory and the related 
procedures are transparent.  In the end all religions should have a fair chance of obtaining that 
‘special’ status. Particularly relevant for the analysis here, and its focus on (differential rights and 
treatment of) traditional and ‘new’ religions, is the Court’s critical scrutiny of requirements of 
enduring existence. 
In a case pertaining to the Church of Scientology in Russia (Kimlya et al v Russia, 1 October 2009), the 
Court criticized a 15 year waiting period before religious movements could become eligible for 
registration as unreasonable. According to the Court, this arrangement violates article 9’s freedom of 
religion because it would disproportionately thwart the manifestation of religion by relatively new 
religious minorities (par. 99-102). A similar finding was made in a case pertaining to Jehovah’s 
witnesses a year earlier (Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v Austria, 31 July 
2008), where a waiting period of 20 years -until a religious movement could obtain recognition as a 
legal entity- was considered a violation of article 9. The Court held that this prolonged lack of legal 
status disproportionately inhibited the exercise of several of the movement’s religious activities (par. 
78-80). 
Apparently the Court gives increasingly pride of place to state duties of neutrality and impartiality, 
also in the field of registration and recognition systems, which are arguably at the core of ‘religion-
state relations’. This was more recently confirmed in a case brought by various religious communities 
against Hungary (Magyar Kereszteny Mennonita Egyhaz et al v Hungary, 8 April 2014,). The case was 
triggered by a change in the legislation on the requirements to obtain the status of incorporated 
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church (necessary to perform all religious activities). The new law introduced an extensive length of 
existence requirement of 100 years internationally or 20 years in Hungary. In its analysis the Court 
underscores the central importance of neutrality and impartiality, also when the state exercises its 
regulatory power in the sphere of religious freedom in its relations with different religions and beliefs 
(par. 76). According to the Court, state duties of neutrality and impartiality are at odds with placing 
novel communities in a disadvantageous situation, by inhibiting them in the exercise of their religious 
activities: ‘the Court accepts that the prescription of a reasonable period might be necessary in the 
case of newly established and unknown religious groups. But the same is hardly justified for religious 
groups established … after the end of the communist regime in Hungary and which must be familiar 
to the competent authorities by now’ (par. 111). The Court goes on to opine that ‘such 
differentiation does not satisfy the requirements of State neutrality and is devoid of objective 
grounds for the differential treatment. Such discrimination imposes a burden on believers of smaller 
religious communities without an objective and justifiable reason’ (par. 112). 
The latter case makes abundantly clear that the Court is critical about a state which operates a 
distinction between religious communities, also in terms of required amount of years in existence, 
when this would disadvantage new religious groups/minorities, without reasonable and objective 
justification. The Court furthermore links this discrimination reasoning explicitly to a failure to 
respect state duties of neutrality and impartiality.  
Obviously both in Magyar Kereszteny and in Kimlya the differential treatment between religious 
communities is central to the case. Nevertheless, in both cases the Court refuses to make an explicit 
assessment in terms of article 14’s prohibition of discrimination, because the inequality of treatment 
was sufficiently taken into account in the assessment of article 9 (Kimlya, par 104; Magyar 
Kereszteny, par 114).  It is indeed standing practice of the Court not to investigate the discrimination 
complaint (under article 14 in combination with another article), when it has already concluded to a 
violation of the latter article in itself. iv Nevertheless, the Court used to underscore that this would 
be different if the differential treatment is a fundamental aspect of the case (Airey v Ireland, 9 
October 1979; Melchior 1991). This line is obviously not adopted in the cases discussed here, which is 
especially striking in Magyar Kerezsteny where the analysis under article 9 is actually replete with 
discrimination lingo (both regarding terminology and criteria). 
Interestingly, in Magyar Kerezsteny the Court does seem to hint at an impending re-assessment 
about the compatibility of state churches with the Convention. More particularly the Court argues 
that historical-constitutional traditions of countries can imply that a state church is acceptable under 
article 9, especially when this predates accession to the Convention (par. 100). The Court is careful 
not to limit the acceptability of state churches to those predating accession. Nevertheless, in its 
balancing exercise under article 9 it does explicitly take into account that the change in legislation, 
and the introduction of a two tier system (and related differentiation), was a new (recent) 
development. The Court furthermore acknowledges that a state church implies ‘providing state 
benefits only to some religious entities and not to others in furtherance of legally prescribed public 
interests’ (par. 113), and underscores that this should be based  ‘on reasonable criteria related to the 
pursuance of public interests’ (par. 113).  
Overall, the Court is clearly sending multiple signals that state churches are potentially problematic in 
view of state duties of neutrality and impartiality under article 9. Notwithstanding its refusal to 
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assess the case in terms of article 14, it’s reasoning under article 9 highlights the discrimination 
problem. A more explicit analysis in terms of the prohibition of discrimination and a substantive 
consolidation of this line of reasoning would certainly increase the protection of newer religious 
movements, particularly against disadvantageous treatment in comparison with dominant religions 
which have obtained the status of state church.  
The other religious theme analysed here, namely the place of religion in education, is equally closely 
intertwined with national (constitutional) identity while fundamentally concerning the relation 
between the traditionally dominant religion and newer religious movements. Also here interesting 
developments can be identified regarding the way in which the Court deals with differentiations 
between religious movements, and the margin of appreciation it leaves states. However, no 
consistent pattern can be discerned in this respect: the two judgments discussed here demonstrate 
very different approaches to the matter indeed. On the one hand, Folgero is widely considered to be 
the judgment which sets clear limits to the extent to which a traditional religion may dominate 
teaching in the public curriculum (Tulkens 2009). The more recent judgment in Lautsi on the other 
hand allows states to have a symbol of the traditional religion, to the exclusion of symbols of other 
religions, in all classrooms of public schools.  
Folgerø et al v Norway (29 June 2007) concerns religious education in a country where the 
overwhelming majority adheres to the state religion, Lutheran. The complaint pertains to a new 
compulsory subject which was introduced, namely ‘Christianity, Religion and Philosophy’. According 
to the claimants this subject would not provide objective, critical and pluralistic information, but 
would be strongly geared towards Christianity. In its preceding jurisprudence the Court had 
interpreted parents’ right to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the education 
of their children (under article 2, protocol 1) as requiring states to ensure that the information 
included in the public curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. This 
requirement is arguably closely related to state duties of neutrality and impartiality under article 9 
(the lex generalis concerning the freedom of religion). 
However, the Court had reduced parents’ right to a protection against indoctrination,  because it 
would be impossible to construct a curriculum that pleases all parents in all respects (Martinez-
Torron 2012; Plesner 2005). The parents’ rights were further reduced by the Court’s acceptance that 
the prohibition of indoctrination only covers actual instances of coercion and blatant indoctrination, 
thus disregarding more subtle forms of indoctrination (Henrard 2011c). Indeed, traditionally the 
Court accepted that education about (not of) religions, focuses on a particular religion (to the virtual 
exclusion of all others) because of its traditional importance in the country (Evans 2008). This line of 
reasoning was criticized because it is difficult to understand how a course, which is pervaded by the 
doctrine of one religion, can provide objective, critical and pluralistic information.  
In Folgerø the Court purports to conform to this line of jurisprudence, explicitly confirming that 
states have a wide margin of appreciation regarding curriculum choices, and repeating that in itself 
disproportionate attention to one particular religion in a class ‘about’ religions in public education 
would not amount to indoctrination (par. 89). The Court even states that the important place of one 
particular faith in the national history may legitimately influence the choices of the national 
authorities in terms of curriculum (par. 89). Nevertheless, on closer scrutiny the Court actually 
scrutinizes all aspects of the course closely, thus leaving a narrow margin to the state (par. 90-93). 
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Apparently, the Court no longer accepts that the traditional religion ‘dominates’ a class about 
religions in the public curriculum. Indeed, it concludes in Folgerø to a violation of the Convention 
because the quantitative and qualitative differences in the course between Christianity and the other 
religions imply a failure to provide the requisite objective, critical and pluralistic information in public 
education (par. 95 and 101; Henrard 2011c). 
However, in other cases the Court has (ultimately) allowed states to perpetuate the traditional 
dominance of one particular religion, de facto excluding the other (newer) religions and philosophical 
convictions. A case which needs to be discussed in this respect is the Lautsi case, which turns around 
the question whether having a crucifix in classrooms of state schools violates state duties to respect 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions in relation to education and to teaching (article 2, 
protocol no 1). The Lautsi case actually gave rise to two judgments of the ECtHR, one by a regular 
section of 7 judges, and one by the Grand Chamber, consisting of 17 judges. The Grand Chamber only 
considers a case when it concerns important interpretation questions of the Convention, and/or 
decisive shifts in existing lines of jurisprudence. In Lautsi, the Grand Chamber reconsidered the case, 
and formulated a second judgment with virtual opposite reasoning and conclusions in comparison to 
the first judgment. The Chamber judgment had actually focused on state duties of neutrality and 
impartiality in religious matters, and had concluded to a violation because the government aligned 
itself with one particular religion in the public education arena. The Grand Chamber’s judgment is 
focused upon here, because that is the judgment that carries most weight, and ultimately reflects the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber judgment shows again a Court which 
prefers to gloss over super-diversity features. 
The Grand Chamber does acknowledge that the state duty to impart information and knowledge in 
an objective, critical and pluralistic manner applies to the organization of the school environment 
(Henrard 2011c), and thus to the question of the cruficix in the classroom (para 63,65). It also admits 
that the crucifix is above all a religious symbol (par 66) and a mandatory crucifix in every classroom 
of a public school ‘confers on the country’s majority religion preponderant visibility in the school 
environment’ (par. 71). Nevertheless, throughout it’s reasoning the Grand Chamber focuses on the 
wide margin of appreciation of states regarding the organization of the school environment (Henrard 
2011c). Unsurprisingly, it follows the government’s arguments about the lack of evidence that the 
display of a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils (par. 66), and about 
the crucifix being a merely passive symbol (par. 72), while there is no obligatory teaching of 
Christianity, and religious practices of minority religions are allowed at public schools (par. 74). In 
other words, in the end, the Grand Chamber hides behind the broad margin of appreciation it grants 
states in the matter and accepts the preponderant visibility of the dominant, traditional religion in 
the public school environment. 
The preceding analysis revealed marked differences in the ECtHR’s approach to ‘religious super-
diversity’, more particularly regarding the extent to which it de facto steers states in a particular 
direction, while narrowing their margin of appreciation. It is striking that the Court becomes ever 
more critical about differentiations between the various religions present in a state, not only 
regarding registration and recognition schemes but also concerning the place of religion in the public 
curriculum. The Court’s criticism regarding the demand of an extensive time period of presence 
before a religious movement would be eligible for registration, clearly benefits new religious 
minorities, and fights disadvantageous treatment of the latter as compared to traditional religions. 
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Similarly, the Court does not accept that a course on religion in the public curriculum 
disproportionately reflects the traditional, dominant religion. However, in other cases the Court still 
allows states (a broad margin of appreciation) to perpetuate the traditional dominance of one 
particular religion, de facto excluding the other (newer) religions and philosophical convictions. Put 
differently, the analysis of the cases on religious themes confirms the lack of consistent approach and 
of related lines of jurisprudence by the ECtHR pertaining to (religious) ‘super-diversity’. 
Official recognition of minority marriages: religious marriages versus Roma marriage 
This lack of a considered and consistent approach towards cases concerning ‘super-diversity’ and the 
emergence of relevant criteria to evaluate these is further compounded by the Munos Diaz 
judgment. This case concerns the double discrimination complaint by a Roma widow, who was only 
married in accordance with Roma rites. Throughout its reasoning the Court exhibits an ambivalent 
attitude towards the recognition of Roma marriages in comparison to religious marriages. 
According to Spanish legislation, a widow only receives a survivor’s pension when she is officially 
married, that is following a civil wedding or one of the religious weddings which are recognized as 
official marriage. Nevertheless, other marriages that are ‘in good faith’ are also accepted as a basis 
for a survivor’s pension. The Court follows the widow’s reasoning that the state duty to give special 
consideration to the needs of minorities also implies that they need to consider marriages according 
to Roma rites that are accepted as such by that community as ‘marriages in good faith’. According to 
the Court the facts clearly disclose that the widow was married in good faith (par. 58), which the 
government had actually officially recognized several times (par. 62-63). Consequently, the Court 
opined that Spain’s failure to grant the widow a survivor’s pension because her marriage would not 
be in good faith, amounts to a differential treatment which does not have a reasonable and objective 
justification and thus to a prohibited discrimination (par. 71).  
However, the Court does not consider that the Spanish state’s refusal to recognize Roma marriages 
as valid, official marriages amounts to (a second instance of) a prohibited discrimination (par.  81). 
While there may be good reasons to distinguish Roma marriages from those marriages that were 
officially recognized so far, the Court does not really argue that in any way. It simply states that this 
complaint is manifestly ill founded because Roma marriages are not religious marriages (par.  80-81). 
The latter statement seems to refer to a lack of comparability between Roma and religious 
marriages. The claimant’s argument that Roma marriage is deeply rooted in Roma culture and that 
this marriage is the only one accepted by the community (par. 76) arguably implies that Roma 
marriages are comparable to religious marriages. However, the Court in no way specifies in what way 
Roma  marriages would need to be comparable to religious marriages -in order to become eligible for 
official recognition- and actually are not. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the Court’s point 
about Spain not having denied the essence of the right to marry because everyone can obtain a civil 
marriage (par. 78-79), addresses the complaint that Roma marriage are not officially recognized in 
comparison to several other (religious) non-civil marriages (Ruiz Vieytez 2013).  
Regarding this second discrimination complaint the Court does not hide behind a broad margin of 
appreciation it leaves to the state, it clearly does not want to actually evaluate and pronounce itself 
on the underlying differential treatment and rights of different ‘ethnic’ groups. In other words, in 
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regard to the second discrimination claim, the Court fails to engage with the substance of the 
complaint and thus also fails to acknowledge and address the super-diverse dimension at hand. 
A (consistent) strategy on super-diversity: the rule of law and an explicit development of 
the Court’s non-discrimination jurisprudence  
When critically comparing the ECtHR’s approach in the various cases analysed here, the Court has 
clearly not developed a thought-out approach towards super-diversity, which clarifies the different 
criteria, that are relevant, as well as the way in which these interact in concrete cases. Each of the 
selected cases deals with ‘superdiversity’, defined in this working paper, as an encounter of different 
layers of ethnic diversity, more particularly the differential treatment and different rights meted out 
to the distinctive ethnic groups: traditional versus less traditional ethnic groups; traditional, 
dominant versus newer minority religions; and religious versus ethnic minorities.  
Indeed, the Court’s practice reveals different approaches rather than a recurring pattern. At times 
the Court chooses to critically assess differential treatment of different layers of diversity, while at 
other times it ignores this dimension and/or prefers to hide behind a broad margin of appreciation of 
the state parties. Strikingly, the Court does not acknowledge these different approaches, let alone 
attempts to explain these differences in light of an overarching rationale and relevant variables (for 
example the degree to which national constitutional identity questions are in order).  
The resulting uneven track-record of the Court in relation to cases regarding super-diversity, entails a 
lack of predictability, which sits uneasily with the rule of law.  The latter is not only one of the 
foundational values of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Lautenbach 2013), the 
ECtHR furthermore uses the rule of law as a fundamental guiding principle to the application and 
interpretation of the Convention (Greer 2013:195). 
Furthermore, in most cases the explicit non-discrimination analysis (in terms of article 14) is avoided, 
notwithstanding the centrality of the differential treatment and rights of the respective ethnic 
groups. If the Court would develop its more explicit reasoning in cases concerning super-diversity in 
terms of the prohibition of discrimination, this would not only improve predictability (and thus the 
rule of law), but would also imply an important boost for the Courts’ non-discrimination 
jurisprudence. Admittedly, cases reflecting super-diversity would tend to be complex cases, in which 
an extensive range of relevant interests are at play, and often several layers of disadvantage co-exist 
and exacerbate one another. Consequently, it may be impossible for the Court to quantify exactly the 
respective weight of all the interests in play. Nevertheless, the Court would greatly enhance the 
transparency (and predictability) of its reasoning if it would acknowledge the differential rights 
concerned, identify the related interests, and reflect on their relative weight, while having regard to 
a possible multitude of layers of disadvantage. Over time, the Court could then refine the relevant 
parameters and build its jurisprudence, gradually but surely.  
Recommendations by way of conclusion 
As contemporary societies are increasingly becoming super-diverse, and as the rule of law, a 
hallmark of the ECHR system and of liberal democracies, requires a decent level of predictability, the 
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ECtHR is recommended to develop a more explicit, consistent and coherent approach to deal with 
cases concerning super-diversity. It is in any event important that the Court does not totally abdicate 
European supervision, even when it grants states a certain margin of appreciation.  
The Court correctly acknowledges that arguments relating to ‘tradition’ (we always did it this way – 
this reflects the traditional dominance of a particular religion) should not be decisive. In addition, it 
remains important to clarify, in terms of the prohibition of discrimination, what factors are relevant 
to evaluate the acceptability of differentiated rights for different population groups. Arguably, the 
differentiation in rights of the different groups should take into account the extent to which they are 
comparable in particular respects. Furthermore, the mere fact of being traditional or rather new 
should not be decisive. Instead, other more substantive factors, that matter for the particular subject 
matter at hand, should be identified. The selected case law has already clarified that for example in 
the field of electoral rights concerns about representativity matter, while for religion in education, 
state neutrality is an important consideration. Similar guiding principles can be identified for other 
subject matters on the basis of the existing jurisprudence, and can then be related to the relevant 
super-diversity marker.  A lot will still depend of the interpretation adopted by the Court, as well as 
by the weighing of all respective interests. Nevertheless, incorporating these super-diversity 
considerations in a consistent manner in the Court’s reasoning will contribute to a coherent 
jurisprudence, in line with the rule of law. Furthermore the concomitant gradual refinement of the 
ECtHR’s non-discrimination jurisprudence could also contribute to tackling other types of complex 
cases. 
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Endnotes 
                                                     
i
 The term court and international court is used here in the broad sense of the word, encompassing quasi-
judical or court-like bodies. These bodies do not produce legally binding jurisprudence but their 
pronouncements have nevertheless considerable de facto authority.  
ii
 According to the Court ‘there are numerous ways of organizing and running electoral systems and a wealth of 
differences, inter alia in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it 
is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision’ (Hirst v  UK (no 2), EHRM (GC) 6 
October 2005, par. 61). 
iii
 At the same time the case and its aftermath demonstrate the limit of international law and the binding legal 
judgments of the ECtHR. While international law is clear that domestic law, even if constitutional in character, 
cannot justify non compliance with international law and judgments, ‘compliance is always more difficult and 
presents more complex political challenges when constitutional instruments have been considered to be in 
violation of the Convention’ (Milanovic 2010). An ongoing political deadlock in the country blocks the 
constitutional amendment which is required to comply with the Court’s judgment: by May 2014 the country 
has still not implemented the judgment (which should have been complied with by October 2010 for the 
Council of Europe, and again by 31 august 2012 for the EU’s accession negotiations: see also Brljavac 2012). 
iv
 Article 14 ECHR only prohibits discrimination in relation to the other rights of the ECHR and thus needs to be 
invoked with another article, enshrining a particular substantive right. 
